Rwanda is a constitutional republic dominated
by a strong presidency. The ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) leads a
coalition that includes six smaller parties. In August 2010 voters elected
President Paul Kagame to a second seven-year term with 93 percent of the vote.
Three other registered political parties participated in elections. Senate
elections took place in September 2011, with RPF candidates winning the
majority of seats by wide margins. International observers reported the senate
elections met generally recognized standards of free and fair elections in most
respects but noted concerns regarding the independence of voters’ decisions.
State security forces (SSF) generally reported to civilian authorities,
although there were instances in which elements of the security forces acted
independently of civilian control.
The most important human rights problems in
the country remained the government’s targeting of journalists, political
opponents, and human rights advocates for harassment, arrest, and abuse;
disregard for the rule of law among security forces and the judiciary;
restrictions on civil liberties; and support of rebel groups in the neighboring
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Other major human rights problems included
arbitrary or unlawful killings, both within the country and abroad;
disappearances; torture; harsh conditions in prisons and detention centers;
arbitrary arrest; prolonged pretrial detention; executive interference in the
judiciary; and government infringement on citizens’ privacy rights. The
government restricted freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, and to
a lesser extent, religion. Security for refugees and asylum seekers was
inadequate. Corruption was a problem, and the government restricted and
harassed local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Violence
and discrimination against women and children occurred, including the
recruitment by the M23 armed group of Rwandan and refugee minors as child
soldiers. There was a small but growing incidence of trafficking in persons.
Discrimination and occasional violence against persons with disabilities and
the Twa minority occurred. The government restricted labor rights, and forced
labor, including by children, and child labor were problems.
The government generally took steps to
prosecute or punish officials who committed abuses, whether in the security
services or elsewhere, but impunity involving civilian officials and SSF was a
problem.
During the year the government provided material,
logistical, and strategic support to the M23 armed group in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which committed summary executions and
forcibly recruited adults and minors. The government strongly denied providing
any support to the M23. SSF remained complicit in the illegal smuggling of
conflict minerals from the DRC.
There were several reports the government
attempted to commit arbitrary or unlawful killings within the country and
abroad. The government typically investigated SSF killings within the country
and prosecuted perpetrators. The government investigated sporadic grenade
attacks and a spate of machete killings across the country and continued to
prosecute individuals who threatened or harmed genocide survivors and
witnesses.
On October 15, Mozambique police found former
Rwandan Development Board Managing Director Theogene Turatsinze floating dead
and tied with ropes in a lake two days after he was reported missing.
Mozambique police initially indicated Rwandan government involvement in the
killing before contacting the government and changing its characterization to a
common crime. Rwandan government officials publicly condemned the killing and
denied involvement. Domestic political observers commented that Turatsinze had
access to politically sensitive financial information related to certain
Rwandan government insiders. The killing remained unsolved at year’s end.
In a June 27 addendum to its interim report,
in its November 15 final report, and in a November 26 letter to the UN Security
Council, the UN Group of Experts (UNGOE) accused the government of violating UN
arms embargo and sanctions regimes through “direct military support” and “the
provision of material and financial support to armed groups operating in
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.” Specifically, the UNGOE claimed the
government provided weapons and ammunition, recruits, intelligence, political
and financial support, logistics, and direct Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF)
military interventions in support of the M23 armed group rebellion in the
eastern DRC, which began in April. The UNGOE asserted the de facto chain of
command of the M23 started with Rwandan Minister of Defense General James
Kabarebe and included Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense General
Jacques Nziza. The government strenuously disputed the credibility of the UNGOE
report and consistently denied providing any support to the M23. Human Rights
Watch (HRW) and other international experts also provided evidence in support
of the claim of government assistance to the M23. In press releases dated June
3, September 11, November 8, 16, and 20, and December 28, HRW accused the M23
of arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life, including the summary execution
of at least 33 recruits, among other abuses. The UNGOE echoed such claims,
alleging the M23 and RDF troops killed dozens of recruits and prisoners of war
through summary executions, beatings, starvation, or by burying them alive.
Fourteen international NGOs, including Global Witness, Freedom House, and The
Enough Project, published an open letter on December 10 criticizing Rwanda’s
support for the M23 armed group. Several of those NGOs also produced their own
reports and press releases detailing human rights abuses by the M23. In
addition to the M23, the UNGOE alleged the Rwandan government provided material
and financial support to several other armed groups operating in the DRC,
including Raia Mutomboki, the Congolese Defense Forces, and the Patriotic
Resistance Forces of Ituri, among others. The UNGOE had charged each of those
groups, but especially Raia Mutomboki, with committing extrajudicial killings
and other human rights abuses.
Laurent Nkunda, the former leader of the
Congolese armed group National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP),
which was reported to have received support from the Rwandan government,
remained under house arrest without charges. During the year, elements of the
CNDP reconstituted themselves as the M23 armed group. Nkunda was arrested in
2009 by the RDF when he returned to the country reportedly for consultations
with government officials. The Rwandan government has not acted on the DRC’s
2009 extradition request for Nkunda.
In September 2011 security personnel shot and
injured opposition party PS-Imberakuri member Eric Nshimyumuremyi, allegedly
because he was armed and seeking a fight. A PS-Imberakuri spokesperson claimed
Nshimyumuremyi was not armed and was shot because he was a party member. The
Rwanda National Police (RNP) defended SSF action and did not discipline those
involved. Prosecutors charged Nshimyumuremyi with illegal possession of
weapons, and his trial continued at year’s end.
In December 2011 an unidentified gunman killed
Charles Ingabire, a Rwandan journalist and government critic, in Kampala,
Uganda. Both the press and human rights organizations reported Ingabire had
survived an earlier attack in September 2011. Rwandan authorities alleged he
had embezzled from a microfinance company, orphans, and a genocide survivors’
organization and was probably killed for that reason.
Five grenade attacks in January and March in
Kigali’s Muhanga District and Musanze District resulted in three deaths and
injuries to 37 persons. Police arrested several suspects associated with the
attacks, which were widely believed to have been orchestrated by the Democratic
Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) armed group operating mainly in the
eastern DRC. On January 13, judges convicted 21 defendants and acquitted eight
in relation to several 2011 and earlier grenade attacks. Prosecutors earlier
dropped charges against more than 70 others. Of the 29 defendants tried in
court, only four had lawyers, and several maintained SSF members had tortured
them into signing false confessions. Judges placed the onus of proving torture
on the defendants and refused to examine defendants’ claims absent a medical
report; however, Amnesty International and HRW claimed the defendants had no
access to doctors during their time in detention at Kami military intelligence
camp and that such medical examinations could not be obtained without
endangering the doctor. Several appeals continued at year’s end.
On December 6, the High Court in Musanze
District convicted 11 of 12 defendants for threatening state security in
relation to 2011 and earlier grenade attacks and other “terrorist acts.”
According to HRW, many of the defendants had disappeared in 2011, and the majority
claimed in open court they had been tortured and forced into confessing during
illegal detentions at Mukamira military camp. The criminal trial of an
additional 18 SSF defendants began on December 12. An observer of the trial
told HRW the majority of the defendants testified by year’s end and claimed to
have been arrested between 2010 and 2011, illegally detained at Mukamira
military camp, and tortured.
According to HRW, another state security trial
began in December, including defendants charged with the early 2012 grenade
attacks. In addition HRW reported at least three persons who disappeared in
September 2011 and were illegally detained at Kami military intelligence camp
until transfer to Kicukiro prison in December 2011 have been scheduled to go on
trial in a group of 10 defendants in February 2013 for threatening state
security and collaborating with the FDLR.
On December 20, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), based in Tanzania, convicted Augustin Ngirabatware,
the country’s former minister of planning, of genocide and crimes against
humanity. The court sentenced Ngirabatware to 35 years in prison. Ngirabatware
was found to have distributed weapons at checkpoints where Hutu militias would
kill ethnic Tutsis during the 1994 genocide. Ngirabatware’s trial was the last
genocide case tried by the ICTR.
Police arrested 14 individuals in connection
with numerous machete killings between July and September. Assailants tortured
and killed at least 15 prostitutes in Kigali, while small groups
indiscriminately slaughtered more than a dozen prostitutes in Muhanga District
and Musanze District. According to the Association for the Defense of Human
Rights (ARDHO), which received death threats for investigating the Muhanga
killings, citizens were afraid to speak with authorities because the assailants
attacked witnesses who provided information. Some witnesses, human rights
activists, and government officials expressed fear the machete killings were a
terrorist campaign instigated by the FDLR.
The government investigated and prosecuted
individuals accused of threatening or harming genocide survivors and witnesses
or of espousing genocide ideology, which the law defines as dehumanizing an
individual or a group with the same characteristics by threatening,
intimidating, defaming, inciting hatred, negating the genocide, taking revenge,
altering testimony or evidence, killing, planning to kill, or attempting to
kill someone. From January to September, a special protection bureau in the
Office of the National Public Prosecution Authority (NPPA) registered 167 cases
of genocide ideology, of which 64 were filed in court, 31 were dismissed, 10
were reclassified, and 62 were pending investigation. From January to
September, the courts adjudicated 59 cases (63 individuals), convicting 52 and
acquitting 11 (see section 1.e.). Police investigated six murders of genocide
survivors. No information was available regarding charges filed, but according
to the genocide survivors’ association Ibuka, police arrested suspects in all
six cases. On October 1, in Kigali, genocide survivor Alex Rutindura, who media
reported was involved in a court case over his parents’ land, survived a
machete attack by six assailants, the third attempt on his life in two years.
There were fewer reports of disappearances and
politically motivated abductions or kidnappings than in previous years, but
local human rights organizations ceased investigating disappearances during the
year after reporting pressure from government officials, including threats and
allegations of treason. Amnesty International, the Rwandan League for the
Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LIPRODHOR), and other observers alleged
SSF, including the RDF J-2 Military Intelligence Directorate, the National
Intelligence and Security Services (NISS), and the RNP’s Department of
Intelligence, orchestrated the disappearances. The government occasionally made
efforts to investigate occurrences but did not punish any perpetrators.
On September 5, unknown persons abducted
Alexis Bakunzibake, vice president of the unregistered faction of
PS-Imberakuri, from a bus station in Kigali. Two days later Bakunzibake
reappeared across the border in Uganda, claiming his kidnappers interrogated
him about PS-Imberakuri’s plans to register and compete in the 2013
parliamentary elections, its funding sources and supporters, and his
conversations with HRW, Amnesty International, and foreign diplomats.
Bakunzibake further alleged his kidnappers bound and blindfolded him before staging
a mock execution and then warned him to get out of politics. Bakunzibake and
other PS-Imberakuri members fled the country soon thereafter. The RNP did not
launch an investigation into the incident, claiming Bakunzibake did not file a
formal complaint in person.
The constitution and law prohibit such
practices, and there were fewer reports of abuse of detainees and prisoners by
military and NISS officials than in 2011; however, reports of abuse by police
intelligence officials increased. Authorities dismissed or disciplined some
police officers for use of excessive force and other abuses during the year.
Police investigations led to formal criminal charges filed in court in more
serious cases.
On May 2, the government signed into law a new
penal code that upgrades torture from an aggravating circumstance to a crime in
itself. The new law mandates the maximum penalty, defined by extent of injury,
for SSF and other government perpetrators.
There were numerous new reports during the
year of detainee abuse and lengthy illegal detention by police intelligence at
Kwa Gacinya detention center in Kigali, despite government assertions the
center had been closed. Former detainees told HRW they were detained in
isolation and repeatedly beaten by police intelligence with plastic batons or
bare hands to secure information and force confessions. Between May and August,
police arrested at least 15 persons in connection with an electronics theft ring
in Kigali. According to HRW, several of the defendants told the judge during a
September pretrial detention hearing police had illegally detained and beaten
them into forced confessions, but the judge accepted the prosecution’s
argument, based on precedent set by the 2011 “grenade case,” that illegal
detention could be excusable by investigative prerogative and that claims of
torture and abuse could not be examined without a medical report.
Amnesty International reports published in
April and October documented 18 allegations of torture and other cruel,
inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment perpetrated by military
intelligence and other SSF personnel in 2010 and 2011 to secure information or
force confessions at Kami military intelligence camp, Ministry of Defense
(MINADEF) headquarters, Mukamira military camp, and safe houses. Former
detainees repeatedly alleged to Amnesty International, HRW, and LIPRODHOR they
endured sleep deprivation, sensory deprivation, starvation, extraction of
fingernails, electrocution, scalding, melting of plastic bags over the head,
suffocation, burning or branding, beating, and simulated drowning through
confinement in cisterns filled with rain water. Local and international human
rights organizations reported the RDF took positive steps during the year to
reform military interrogation methods and detention standards, resulting in
fewer reports of torture and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or
punishment at Kami and other military detention facilities; however, they
cautioned the increased use of safe houses by NISS, RDF J-2, and RNP
Intelligence made monitoring more difficult.
In addition to torture, former detainees
repeatedly alleged to Amnesty International, HRW, and LIPRODHOR that, while in
military intelligence detention in 2010 and 2011 at Kami, they had been held in
solitary confinement, without light and without communication with the outside
world, they were allowed only two bathroom visits per day, they had to eat next
to their feces, and they were sometimes told the food was poisoned. RDF reforms
led to a reduction in such reports during the year, according to local and
international human rights organizations, but the increased use of safe houses
complicated monitoring efforts.
Prison and detention center conditions were
harsh, although the government made numerous improvements during the year.
Police sometimes beat newly arrested suspects to obtain confessions. There were
numerous reports of detainee abuse and lengthy illegal detention by police
intelligence at Kwa Gacinya detention center in Kigali. There were reports that
J-2 military intelligence personnel employed torture and other cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment to obtain confessions in military
detention centers, although less frequently than in the previous year (see
section 1.c). The SSF increasingly used safe houses to detain and interrogate
“security” detainees and military officials accused of insubordination. The
government selectively permitted visits by independent human rights observers.
Physical Conditions: At year’s end the prison population was
55,618, over 90 percent of whom were men. A total of 333 prisoners were
juveniles. The system was designed for 54,700. Men and women were held
separately in similar conditions, although overcrowding was more prevalent in
male wards. Fewer than 100 children under the age of three lived with their
parents in prison. The Rwanda Correctional Services (RCS) provided five nursery
schools, one psychosocial center, and fresh milk for such children. All
juveniles were held at Nyagatare Rehabilitation Center or in special wings of
regular prisons. There were no reports of abuse of juveniles, and the RCS
continued to improve access to lawyers, education, and job training for
juveniles. Individuals convicted of genocide-related offenses comprised a
majority of the adult prison population. Authorities generally separated
pretrial detainees from convicted prisoners; however, there were numerous exceptions
due to the large number of detainees awaiting trial.
The government continued to hold eight
prisoners of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in a purpose-built detention
center, which the UN deemed met international standards for incarceration of
prisoners convicted by international criminal tribunals. The government held
international transfers and some high-profile “security” prisoners in similarly
upgraded maximum security wings of Kigali Central “1930” Prison.
Unlike in the previous year, there were no
prison riots. A riot at Huye Prison in July 2011 resulted in the deaths of five
prisoners, who reportedly were shot by guards.
Prisoner deaths resulted from anemia,
HIV/AIDS, respiratory diseases, malaria, and other diseases at rates similar to
those found in the general population. Medical care in prisons was commensurate
with care for the public at large. The government enrolled all prisoners in the
national health insurance plan. Prisoners had access to potable water. The
Ministry of Internal Security (MININTER) implemented a 2011 directive taking
full responsibility to provide food for prisoners through contracted cafeteria
services, canteens, and prison gardens. Family members were permitted to
supplement the diets of vulnerable prisoners with health issues. Ventilation
and temperature conditions improved as overcrowding continued to decline.
According to the RCS, each prison had dormitories, toilets, sports facilities,
a health center, a guest hall, a kitchen, water, and electricity, as required by
a 2006 presidential order governing prison conditions.
Conditions in police and military detention
centers varied. Overcrowding was common in police detention centers, and poor
ventilation often led to high temperatures. Provision of food and medical care
was inconsistent, and some detainees claimed to have gone for several days
without food. There were complaints regarding inadequate sanitation in some
detention centers, and not all detention centers had toilets. There were
numerous reports of substandard conditions for civilians held in military
detention centers.
Gikondo Transit Center, where Kigali
authorities held street children, vagrants, suspected prostitutes, and street
sellers, continued to operate despite a Senate committee’s 2008 call for its closure
due to substandard conditions (see section 1.d.). Two other transit centers,
where conditions generally met basic international standards, operated under
the management of the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion (MIGEPROF), as
did one transit center under church management. Hundreds of male transit center
detainees and at-risk youth between the ages of 18 and 35 were transferred to
the Iwawa Rehabilitation and Vocational Development Center on Iwawa Island,
where substandard sanitation and nutrition resulted in disease outbreaks and
several deaths. During the year there were reports of individuals drowning
while attempting to escape. There were also reports the RDF recruited
individuals from Iwawa to join the M23 armed group in the DRC (see sections
1.a. and 6, children.).
Administration: Recordkeeping on prisoners and detainees
remained inadequate, but authorities took steps to transfer paper files to an
electronic database. Domestic and international human rights organizations
reported numerous instances of long delays and failures to locate prisoners and
detainees. There were reports of forgotten detainees and of prisoners who
remained incarcerated beyond their release date due to misplaced records. The
RCS provided additional training to its staff on the shift from penal to
rehabilitative detention as it coped with the July 2011 merger of the National
Prisons Service and the Works for General Interest (TIG) community service
program for perpetrators of the genocide. The Nyagatare Rehabilitation Center
for juveniles continued renovations with the assistance of the Dignity in
Detention Foundation and UNICEF to align with rehabilitative priorities. In May
the government amended the penal code to allow community service as alternative
sentencing for misdemeanors and petty offenses, and the Ministry of Justice
(MINIJUST) instructed judges to utilize alternative sentencing to incarceration
for nonviolent offenders during the first half of the year. MININTER granted
conditional release to 1,421 prisoners in May. The law provides for an
ombudsman who has the power to carry out investigations of prisons. The
ombudsman also receives and examines complaints from individuals and
independent associations relating to civil servants, state organs, and private
institutions. Prisoners and detainees had weekly access to visitors and were
permitted religious observance. Prison staff held regular meetings with
prisoners and detainees to listen to inmates’ complaints and take action to
resolve them when possible. The MININTER permanent secretary personally
inspected all prisons and took steps to hire staff for a human rights
inspectorate within the ministry. The chief of defense staff supervised
detention reform efforts in MINADEF.
Monitoring: The government permitted independent monitoring of prison
conditions by diplomats, as well as the International Committee of the Red
Cross, which reported unimpeded access on an unannounced basis to all the
prisons, police stations, and military facilities that it visited during the year.
HRW obtained access to visit prisons, but the government repeatedly blocked
access to individual prisoners and subsequently ruled HRW did not have the
right to request access to individual prisoners. Amnesty International was
unable to visit prisons due to government delays in permit approval.
Journalists may access prisons with a valid press card but must request
permission from the RCS commissioner to interview or take photos. The
government did not permit independent monitoring of safe houses. It also denied
local human rights NGOs, including LIPRODHOR and the Youth Association for
Human Rights Promotion and Development (AJPRODHO-JIJUKIRWA), permits to visit
prisons and police detention centers.
Improvements: There were continued improvements in treatment of the general
prison population. Overcrowding in prisons continued to decline. MININTER took
full responsibility to provide food for prisoners. Unannounced quarterly
inspections by the MININTER permanent secretary led to improved recordkeeping
and treatment of prisoners in RCS facilities, while periodic monitoring by the
MINADEF chief of defense staff led to a reduction in reported abuses at
military detention facilities. Under the RCS Strategic Plan 2012-17, RCS
undertook renovations of some of the 14 existing prison facilities and began
construction of Butamwa Prison, which will replace Kigali Central “1930” Prison
upon completion. As part of a shift to rehabilitative detention, RCS had 2,848
regular prisoners and 650 TIG camp prisoners in vocational training programs at
year’s end. Also, 4,432 regular prisoners and 849 TIG camp prisoners were
participating in literacy and language education. RCS established a
psychosocial center for children under the age of three who lived with their
parents in prison. All juvenile cases were recorded and submitted to MINIJUST
and other government institutions on a quarterly basis, and increased efforts
were made to provide juveniles legal assistance through Legal Aid Week.
The constitution and law prohibit arbitrary
arrest and detention; however, SSF personnel regularly arrested and detained
persons arbitrarily and without due process.
ROLE OF THE POLICE AND
SECURITY APPARATUS
The RNP, under MININTER, is responsible for
internal security. The RDF, under MINADEF, is charged with providing external
security. Authorities generally maintained control over the RNP and RDF, and
the government had mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption.
The Inspectorate General of the RNP generally disciplined police for excessive
use of force and prosecuted acts of corruption, and the RDF normally displayed
a high level of military professionalism; however, at times elements of the SSF
may have acted independently of civilian control. For instance, there were
several reports of impunity involving the RDF J-2, NISS, and RNP Intelligence
forces related to disappearances, illegal detention, and torture in military
and police intelligence detention centers and in safe houses (see section 1.c.).
Police lacked sufficient basic resources such
as handcuffs, radios, and patrol cars, but observers credited the RNP with
generally strong discipline and effectiveness. Nevertheless, there were reports
of police arbitrarily arresting and beating individuals, engaging in corrupt
activities, and demonstrating a lack of discipline. The RNP institutionalized
training in community relations, which included appropriate use of force and
human rights. The National Police Academy offered an undergraduate program in professional
police studies.
There also were reports of abuse of suspects
by local defense forces (LDF), a statutorily established law enforcement
organization of approximately 20,000 members under the Ministry of Local
Government (MINALOC) that assisted the police. Communities chose volunteers to
serve in the LDF. The RNP exercised tactical control of LDF, while local
officials had responsibility for operational oversight. LDF performed basic
security guard duties throughout the country and chased illegal street vendors,
petty criminals, and prostitutes from public areas. LDF ordinarily were unpaid
and received less training than RNP officers. They did not have power of arrest
but routinely made illegal arrests on orders from local officials and on their own
authority.
During the year the government warned LDF
against involvement in criminal activity and prosecuted members who committed
crimes. There were fewer reports of LDF abuses than in prior years; however,
some human rights groups accused the government of not taking sufficiently
strong action against some members and considered LDF abusive.
On May 13, in Rubavu District, illegal street
vendor Sadiki Mutabazi committed suicide by public self-immolation after being
repeatedly abused by LDF. The district police commander and mayor maintained
Mutabazi died because he was smoking marijuana and caught himself on fire, but
eyewitnesses claimed Mutabazi deliberately doused himself with petrol after LDF
beat him and confiscated his goods. Several impoverished local residents said
such abuse by LDF was commonplace.
ARREST PROCEDURES AND
TREATMENT WHILE IN DETENTION
The law requires authorities to investigate
and obtain a warrant before arresting a suspect. Before arrest, police may
detain suspects for up to 72 hours without a warrant, and prosecutors must
bring formal charges within seven days of arrest. Authorities sometimes
disregarded these provisions, particularly in security-related cases. SSF held
some suspects incommunicado or under house arrest. At times police employed
nonjudicial punishment when minor criminals confessed and the victims agreed to
the police officer’s recommended penalty, such as a week of detention or
restitution. The law permits investigative detention if authorities believe
public safety is threatened or the accused might flee, and judges interpreted
these provisions broadly. Such detention must be reviewed by a judge every 30
days and may not extend past one year, but in practice SSF held numerous
suspects indefinitely after the first authorization of investigative detention.
The government attributed such continued detention to judicial backlog and
delays in obtaining a court date, and said investigations generally were
completed within 30 days. After the formal filing of the prosecution’s case,
detention is indefinite unless bail is granted. Bail exists only for crimes
with a maximum sentence of five years or less, but authorities may release a
suspect pending trial if satisfied there is no risk that the person may flee or
become a threat to public safety and order. Authorities generally allowed
family members prompt access to detained relatives unless they were held at
intelligence-related detention centers such as Kami or Kwa Gacinya or in safe
houses. The government generally did not respect the right to habeas corpus.
By law detainees are allowed access to
lawyers. In practice the scarcity of lawyers limited access to legal
representation. There were 736 attorneys in the country, a decrease from 2011;
of these, 420 were trainees, mostly located in Kigali. The government did not
provide indigent persons with legal representation. A Legal Aid Forum composed
of 37 organizations, including domestic and international NGOs, the Rwandan Bar
Association, the Corps of Judicial Defenders, and university legal aid clinics,
provided legal aid services to indigents and vulnerable groups, although such
resources were insufficient to provide lawyers for all those in need. The law
requires the government to provide minors with legal representation, which
judicial observers cited as a factor in juvenile trial delays. The government
continued to hold an annual Legal Aid Week, in which it processed as many
juvenile cases as possible to reduce the backlog.
Defendants sometimes remained in prison after
serving their sentences while waiting for an appeal date or due to problems
with prison records. The new penal code signed into law in May provides that
pretrial detention, illegal detention, and administrative sanctions be fully
deducted from the duration of penalties imposed. The law still does not provide
for compensation for those acquitted. It allows judges to impose on SSF and
other government officials who unlawfully detain individuals a detention of
equivalent duration and fines.
Arbitrary Arrest: Police arbitrarily arrested members of
opposition parties, journalists, and members of Jehovah’s Witnesses (see
sections 2.a., 2.c., and 3).
Although there is no requirement that
individuals carry identification, police and LDF regularly detained street
children, vendors, beggars, and citizens without identification and sometimes
charged them with illegal street vending or vagrancy. Authorities released
adults who could produce identification and transported street children to
their home districts, to shelters, or for processing into vocational and
educational programs.
Despite a 2008 Senate committee report that
called for the closure of Kigali’s Gikondo Transit Center for violations of
detainee rights and lack of social services, the facility continued to operate
as a temporary detention facility for street children, substance abusers,
vagrants, suspected prostitutes, and street vendors. Center officials asserted
they had the right to operate on the basis of a 2007 official gazette notice
that reopened the center after previous human rights complaints, and that they
held persons for no more than 10 days; however, some detainees reported waiting
several months before release. Relatives often reported that authorities denied
them access to detainees.
The Ministry of Youth and Information and
Communications Technology continued to operate Iwawa Rehabilitation and
Vocational Development Center on Iwawa Island in Lake Kivu. The center provided
six months’ psychotherapy and then six months’ vocational and technical training
to approximately 1,500 men between the ages of 18 to 35, most of whom were
homeless, substance abusers, or petty criminals whom transit centers, local
officials, or family members referred without recourse to judicial process.
Parents were able to visit their adult children at Iwawa, and at least one
individual left early after his parents complained to their district mayor
about conditions on the island. During the year government officials made plans
to open a similarly remote center for young women.
Pretrial Detention: Lengthy pretrial detention was a serious
problem. According to the RCS, 3,560 men, 343 women, and 49 juveniles (43 of
them male) were in pretrial detention at the end of the year. The law permits
the detention of genocide suspects until they face trial; 85 persons charged
with genocide remained in pretrial detention at year’s end. Authorities
permitted the majority of convicted prisoners (those who had confessed their
genocide crimes) to return to their families, with prison time to be served
after the suspended and community service portions of their sentences.
The government made strides toward eliminating
the case backlog and reducing the average length of pretrial detention. The
inspector general of the NPPA sanctioned government officials who abused
regulations on pretrial detention with penalties such as fines and suspensions.
Despite progress in shortening pretrial
detention in the majority of cases, there were numerous reports of lengthy
pretrial detention and illegal detention of defendants charged with threatening
state security (“undermining national defense” under the new penal code),
terrorism, genocide ideology, divisionism, defamation, contempt for the head of
state, and other security-related sensitive crimes. Such cases were also more
likely to experience repeated delays after trials began.
The constitution and law provide for an
independent judiciary, and the judiciary operated in most cases without
government interference; however, there were constraints on judicial
independence, and government officials sometimes attempted to influence
individual cases. MINIJUST dismissed three judges and clerks during the year
for corruption, and police arrested members of the public for attempting to
bribe judges. Authorities generally respected court orders.
At year’s end there were 1,704 criminal cases
and 1,123 civil cases pending in the regular courts, compared to 8,119 criminal
cases and 11,264 civil cases in June 2011.
TRIAL PROCEDURES
The law provides for a presumption of
innocence, but government officials did not always adhere to this in practice.
The law requires defendants be informed promptly and in detail of the charges
in a language they comprehend; however, judges postponed numerous hearings because
this had not occurred. Defendants have the right to a fair trial without undue
delay, but there were an insufficient number of prosecutors, judges, and
courtrooms to hold trials within a reasonable period of time. In the ordinary
court system (vice military and community justice “gacaca” courts) the law
provides for public trials, although courts closed proceedings in cases
involving minors, to protect witnesses, or at the request of defendants.
Judges, rather than juries, try all cases. Defendants have the right to
communicate with an attorney of choice, although few could afford private
counsel. Minors are guaranteed legal representation by law. The law does not
provide for an attorney at state expense for indigent defendants; however, the
Rwandan Bar Association and 36 other member organizations of the Legal Aid
Forum provided legal assistance to some indigent defendants, although they
lacked the resources to provide defense counsel to all in need. The law
requires that defendants have adequate time and facilities to prepare their
defense, and judges routinely granted requests to extend preparation time.
Defendants and their attorneys have the right to access government-held
evidence relevant to their cases, but courts did not always respect this right.
Defendants have the right to be present at trial, confront witnesses against
them, and present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf. The law protects
defendants from being compelled to testify or confess guilt, and judges
generally respected that right during trial. However, there were numerous
reports SSF coerced suspects into confessing guilt and of judges accepting such
confessions despite defendants’ protests. The law provides for the right to
appeal, and this provision was respected.
The RDF routinely tried military offenders in
military courts, which rendered sentences of fines, imprisonment, or both.
Military courts provided defendants with the same rights as civilian courts,
including the right of appeal and access to government-held evidence relevant
to their cases. The law stipulates military courts can try civilian accomplices
of soldiers accused of crimes. The government did not release figures for the
number of civilians tried as coperpetrators or accomplices of military
personnel.
Gacaca courts served as the government’s
primary mechanism for adjudicating genocide cases. Gacaca defendants are
presumed innocent until proven guilty, and gacaca courts normally decide a case
on the same day a trial begins. There is no bail in the gacaca system.
Defendants are informed of the charges against them at trial, not before.
Defendants can present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf, although
witnesses were sometimes reluctant to testify for fear of reprisals,
particularly accusations of complicity in the crimes alleged. Defendants can
appeal gacaca proceedings to sector-level courts. Defendants are not permitted
legal representation.
During the year courts completed the final 52
gacaca appeals, and on June 15, the government passed laws to close the gacaca
system. According to the summary report presented at closing, since 2005 the
National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions tried 1,958,634 genocide-related cases
(178,741 of which were appeals) in 12,103 courts staffed by 169,442 elected
judges. Gacaca courts had a conviction rate of 86 percent.
Under gacaca the accused were divided into
three categories based on the gravity of the charges brought against them, each
with different sentencing guidelines designed to encourage confessions in
exchange for reduced sentences. Category 1 included planners and supervisors of
the genocide or crimes against humanity, those who committed rape or acts of
sexual torture, and their accomplices. Most Category 1 defendants faced trial
before ordinary courts rather than in gacaca courts. Gacaca courts tried 41,375
Category 1 cases at first instance, representing 2 percent of gacaca trial
cases, and convicted 89 percent. Of those convicted, 19,177 appealed, with 13
percent winning acquittal on appeal. Category 2 included perpetrators,
coperpetrators, and accomplices of murder, attempted murder, manslaughter,
torture, and defilement of corpses. Gacaca courts tried 443,134 Category 2
cases at first instance, representing 25 percent of trial cases, and convicted
60 percent. Of those convicted, 134,394 appealed, with 30 percent winning
acquittal on appeal. Category 3 included persons who committed offenses against
property. Gacaca courts tried 1,295,384 Category 3 cases at first instance,
representing 73 percent of trial cases, and convicted 96 percent. Of those
convicted, only 22,607 appealed, with 10 percent winning acquittal on appeal.
Women represented 10 percent of all cases.
On June 29, the ICTR terminated its
activities; on July 2, the ICTR turned over its remaining genocide cases to a
Tanzania-based branch of the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals
(MICT). The MICT continued to prosecute genocide suspects during the year (see
section 5).
POLITICAL PRISONERS AND
DETAINEES
There were reports local officials and SSF
briefly detained some individuals who disagreed publicly with government
decisions or policies. Neither the government, opposition, nor international or
domestic NGOs maintained lists or estimated numbers of political prisoners.
International and domestic human rights groups sometimes applied the term
“political prisoner” to anyone whose actions were politically motivated, such
as opposition political leaders Victoire Ingabire or Deo Mushayidi, even in
cases where evidence suggested they might have committed the acts of which they
were accused.
On March 1, the government released
high-profile political prisoner and former minister of transportation Charles
Ntakirutinka. Ntakirutinka was confined to a special section of Kigali Central
“1930” Prison during his 10-year sentence for inciting civil disobedience and
association with criminal elements. International and domestic human rights
organizations asserted the charges were politically motivated retaliation for
Ntakirutinka forming the Democratic Party for Renewal with former president
Pasteur Bizimungu to challenge the RPF.
Former 2003 presidential candidate Theoneste
Niyitegeka remained in prison following his 2008 conviction for complicity in
genocide, for which he was sentenced to 15 years in prison. International and
domestic human rights organizations claimed the charges against Niyitegeka were
politically motivated and that there were serious irregularities in
Niyitegeka’s appeal proceedings in sector-level courts, which followed his
acquittal by the gacaca court system.
CIVIL JUDICIAL
PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES
The judiciary was generally independent and
impartial in civil matters. Mechanisms exist for citizens to file lawsuits in
civil matters, including for violations of human rights. They can appeal to the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and the East African
Court of Justice (EACJ), but none did so. The Office of the Ombudsman processes
claims of judicial wrongdoing on an administrative basis. According to a Legal
Aid Forum study released in June, 78 percent of claimants did not receive full
enforcement of their judgments within three months of requesting it, as
required by law.
REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
COURT DECISIONS
On June 22, the EACJ Appellate Division
affirmed the EACJ First Instance Division’s December 2011 ruling that the
arrest and detention without trial of Seveline Rugigana Ngabo, brother of
former army chief of staff Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, was unlawful and therefore
constituted an infringement of the East African Community Treaty. The court
ordered the government to restart Ngabo’s trial immediately, which paused after
the government filed its appeal, and pay costs. On July 25, the Military High
Court acquitted Ngabo of treason but convicted him of conspiring to threaten
state security and inciting violence, sentencing him to nine years’
imprisonment and a fine of 100,000 Rwandan francs ($160). The country had no
other pending cases before the ACHPR or EACJ.
The constitution and law prohibit such
actions; however, there were numerous reports the government monitored homes,
telephone calls, e-mail, and other private communications, movements, and
personal and institutional data. There also were reported instances of
government informer systems within international NGOs, local civil society
organizations, religious organizations, and other social institutions.
The new penal code signed into law in May
provides for legal protection against unauthorized use of personal data by
private entities, although these provisions were not invoked during the year.
Some Tutsi men reported pressure to join the
SSF as a guard against further genocide. Staff members at a few orphanages
reported the RDF pressured some of their young men to join the military during
mandatory “ingando” civic and military training camps held after secondary
school graduation. Some parents reported local RPF leaders also pressured their
children to join the party during ingando. RPF cadres regularly visited
citizens’ homes to demand contributions to the political party, and there were
some reports of persons being denied public services if they did not
contribute. Despite orders from cabinet ministers not to do so, there were
reports local leaders, employers, and Rwandan embassy staff coerced persons
into donating one month’s salary into the government’s Agaciro Development
Fund.
Media and NGOs reported the government
violated due process requirements during the year in evicting some residents,
businesses, and civil society organizations due to city development projects in
Kigali.
The constitution provides for freedom of
speech and press “in conditions prescribed by the law.” The government at times
restricted these rights. The government intimidated and arrested journalists
who expressed views that were deemed critical on sensitive topics or who were
believed to have violated the law or journalistic standards. Numerous
journalists practiced self-censorship.
Freedom of Speech: Individuals could criticize the government
publicly or privately on most topics; however, the laws prohibiting
divisionism, genocide ideology, and genocide denial continued to discourage citizens
from expressing viewpoints that might be construed as promoting societal
divisions. The law prohibits the propagation of ideas based on “ethnic,
regional, racial, religious, language, or other divisive characteristics.”
Public incitement to “genocide ideology” or “divisionism,” which includes
discrimination and sectarianism, is punishable by five to nine years in prison
and fines of 100,000 to one million Rwandan francs ($160 to $1,600). The new
penal code signed into law in May expands former provisions that prohibited the
display of contempt for the head of state or other high-level public officials
to include administrative authorities or other public servants, with sentences
of one to two years in prison and fines of 50,000 to 500,000 Rwandan francs
($80 to $800). Slander of foreign and international officials and dignitaries
remains illegal, with sentences of one to three years in prison. The new penal
code rebrands the crime of “spreading rumors aimed at inciting the population
to rise against the regime” as “spreading false information with intent to
create a hostile international opinion against the Rwandan state,” with much
more severe penalties, including life in prison for acts committed during
wartime and seven to 10 years in prison for acts committed during peacetime.
On September 8, police arrested Secretary
General Sylvain Nsabimana and Kigali City party leader Martin Ntavuka, both of
whom were members of unregistered opposition political party FDU-Inkingi, for
making statements about the lack of political space in Rwanda. Plainclothes
police traveling in the same bus as Nsabimana and Ntavuka denounced them to
local police, who detained them for a few hours at Muhanga District Police
Station and interrogated them about their statements and political activities.
The government asserted the genocide ideology
law was necessary to prevent reincitement to violence, but NGOs and human
rights organizations recommended the law be repealed or amended due to its
overly broad provisions.
For example, on April 22, police arrested
Epaphrodite Habarugira, a journalist at Radio Huguka, after a broadcast that
allegedly supported genocide ideology. Habarugira maintained he confused the
Kinyarwanda words for “victims” and “survivors”; the prosecution argued his
misuse of these words was intended to deny the 1994 genocide. Habarugira
appeared before the Muhanga Intermediate Court on July 30 and was found not
guilty of genocide ideology because the prosecution failed to establish intent.
The prosecution appealed the acquittal, and the case was pending at year’s end.
On November 14, the Gasabo Intermediate Court
in Kigali sentenced Stanley Gatera, editor of Umusinginewspaper, to
one year in prison and fines of 100,000 Rwandan francs ($160) for inciting
divisionism and gender discrimination in an opinion column published in June.
The prosecutor said in court that the article broke the country’s laws about
referring to ethnic identities; the article suggested men may regret marrying a
Tutsi woman solely for her beauty. Gatera, who defended himself in court, said
the newspaper had run an apology in a subsequent issue; however, police called
it a “denial of wrongdoing.”
Freedom of Press: Vendors sold both private and
government-owned newspapers published in English, French, and Kinyarwanda.
There were 37 newspapers, journals, and other publications registered with the
government, although fewer than 10 published regularly. Sporadically published
independent newspapers maintained positions both in support of and contrary to
or critical of the government. There were 25 radio stations (six
government-owned and 19 independent) and one government-run television station.
Under the current media law, the Media High
Council has the power to suspend newspapers. In addition to restrictions on
freedom of speech, which are applicable to journalists, the new penal code
incorporates several existing press offenses from the media law, including:
illegally started media; refusal to publish correction, reply, or
rectification; and intent to undermine public order and territorial integrity.
The new penal code supersedes some aspects of the existing media law to include
a new exemption from criminal liability for breach of personal privacy laws in
relation to the privacy of an authority when such activities adversely affect
the public interest, and to remove press publication on an irregular schedule
as a criminal offense. A court may order journalists to reveal their sources
when deemed necessary to carry out criminal investigations or proceedings. The
law also requires journalists to have either an associate’s degree in
journalism or communication, a certificate obtained from an institute of
journalism and communication, or a university degree with training in
journalism. Previously practicing journalists without one of these
qualifications must obtain them by 2015 to continue in their positions.
Violence and Harassment: Journalists were attacked, detained, and
harassed by police. For example, on June 8, in Northern Province, police
beat Kigali Today newspaper journalist Norbert Niyuzurugero
for unspecified reasons while he was taking photos of the long lines at the
Musanze Taxi Park due to a shortage of minibuses. On June 14, police beat
journalist Anonciata Tumusiime of Radio Flash in front of Parliament during
media policy proceedings, rendering him unconscious. Tumusiime claimed he was
attempting to gather information about the proceedings, but police alleged he
was interfering with security by parading in front of Police Inspector General Emmanuel
Gasana. No action was taken against police officers responsible for the
beatings.
The government did not expel members of the
press from the country; however, several journalists fled the country, and
several journalists who fled in prior years lodged asylum claims abroad.
Censorship or Content Restrictions: The law provides for censorship and content
restrictions relating to some government documents, individual privacy,
slander, and defamation.
On April 5, the Supreme Court reduced the
seven-year sentence of Umurabyo newspaper journalist Saidati
Mukakibibi to three years and the 17-year sentence of Umurabyo editor
Agnes Uwimana to four years. In February 2011 Mukakibibi was convicted of
defamation, inciting public disorder, and divisionism; Uwimana was convicted of
incitement to civil disobedience, contempt for the head of state, spreading
rumors to cause public disorder, denying the genocide, and likening President
Kagame to Adolf Hitler.
The law authorizes private radio and
television broadcasting, subject to the approval of the government, although
some media practitioners complained the licensing fees were prohibitively high.
The government owned and operated the country’s only television station.
Radio stations broadcast criticism of
government policies, including using popular citizen call-in shows.
Libel Laws/National Security: Defamation (libel and slander) is a criminal
offense punishable by fines and imprisonment. Courts convicted journalists and
others on the charge of threatening state security (undermining national
defense under the new penal code) and related crimes (see section 1.a).
INTERNET FREEDOM
The law does not provide for government
restrictions on access to the Internet, but restrictions such as Web site
blocking were in place. There were numerous reports the government monitored
e-mail and Internet chat rooms. Individuals and groups could engage in the
peaceful expression of views via the Internet, including by e-mail, but were
subject to monitoring. There were a few reports monitoring led to detention and
interrogation by SSF. According to the International Telecommunication Union, 7
percent of individuals used the Internet in 2011.
There were reports government blocked access
to several Web sites within the country that were critical of the government.
On February 8, the Swedish government expelled
Rwandan diplomat Evode Mudaheranwa for harassing Jean Bosco Gasasira, a
journalist who had claimed asylum in Sweden. In June 2011 a court had convicted
Gasasira in absentia of displaying contempt for the head of state and
incitement to civil disobedience for his writings in the online
publication Umuvugizi and sentenced him to two and a half
years in prison.
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND
CULTURAL EVENTS
The government generally did not restrict
academic freedom or cultural events, although authorities frequently suspended
secondary and university students for divisionism or engaging in genocide
ideology. In February 2011 police arrested university lecturer Lambert
Havugintwari on charges of threatening state security and smuggling grenades
into the country after he gave a controversial lecture. Havugintwari won
release from prison in 2012 when the High Court in Nyanza District found him
not guilty, and the prosecution declined to appeal.
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
The constitution and law provide for freedom
of assembly, and the government generally respected this right in practice;
however, there were exceptions. Freedom of assembly is subject to restrictions.
Authorities legally may require advance notice for public meetings and
demonstrations, but must respond to such requests within one week or 15 days,
depending on the type of event. The government limited the types of locations
where religious groups could assemble, at times citing municipal zoning
regulations as the reason.
On November 13, the unregistered opposition
political party Democratic Green Party of Rwanda (DGPR) cancelled its planned
November 16 party congress, a required step in party registration, after Gasabo
District officials failed to respond to its September 25 request to hold a
public meeting. District officials denied responsibility for the failure to
respond, citing instructions from the national security council.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
While the constitution provides for freedom of
association, the government limited this right in practice. The law requires
private organizations to register, and the government generally granted
licenses without undue delay; however, the government impeded the formation of
new political parties and restricted political party activities (see section
3). In addition, the government imposed difficult and burdensome NGO
registration and renewal requirements, especially on international NGOs, as
well as time-consuming requirements to submit annual financial and activity
reports (see section 5).
See the Department of State’s International
Religious Freedom Report at www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/rpt.
The constitution and law provide for freedom
of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the
government generally respected these rights in practice.
The government generally cooperated with the
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian
organizations in providing protection and assistance to internally displaced
persons, refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and
other persons of concern.
Foreign Travel: The new penal code allows judges to deprive
convicted defendants of the right to go abroad as a standalone or
postimprisonment punishment. Authorities denied or confiscated passports of
political opponents and their relatives. For example, at year’s end the
government still had not issued a passport to former political prisoner Charles
Ntakirutinka, who was released from prison in March and filed a passport application
shortly thereafter.
Exile: The law prohibits forced exile. Some political dissidents,
journalists, social activists, and former “security” detainees who claimed
harassment and intimidation by the government departed the country during the
year in self-imposed exile.
Emigration and Repatriation: Through August 30, Rwanda accepted 10,778
nationals returning from other countries, according to the UNHCR, most of whom
settled in their districts of origin. Also, 4,432 Rwandan citizens who had been
living in areas of the DRC controlled by the FDLR armed rebel group returned,
according to the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC). The
government worked with UNHCR and other aid organizations to assist the
resettled returnees.
The government continued to accept former
combatants who returned from the DRC; however, the government refused to
repatriate more than 50 M23 combatants, including 14 minors, considered Rwandan
citizens by the government of the DRC, the UN, and HRW. The government demobilized
1,209 adult former combatants from armed groups and rehabilitated 66 children,
reuniting 53 with their families. The RDRC, with international support, placed
adult former combatants in a three-month reeducation program at Mutobo
Demobilization Center in Northern Province. The Musanze Child Rehabilitation
Center, relocated from Muhazi, Eastern Province, treated former child
combatants in Northern Province. After the three-month reeducation period, each
adult former combatant was enrolled automatically in the RDF Reserve Force and
received approximately 60,000 Rwandan francs ($95) and permission to return
home. Two months later each received an additional 120,000 Rwandan francs
($190). In a June 27 addendum to its interim report and in its November 15 final
report, the UNGOE stated the government remobilized repatriated FDLR combatants
and forcibly recruited ex-FDLR from the Mutobo Demobilization Center, deploying
them to the DRC to fight alongside the Rwandan-supported M23 armed group, an
allegation first made by HRW in a September 11 press release. According to the
UN Organization Stabilization Mission for the DRC (MONUSCO), this practice led
to reduced repatriation in the second half of the year. The UNGOE further
reported the RDRC forcibly recruited ex-FDLR child soldiers from demobilization
and sent them to join the M23 (see section 6).
Citizenship: On May 14, the government cancelled the passports of 25
political opponents and their family members residing outside of the country.
According to the Southern Africa Litigation Center, the move rendered the 25
persons, including children, stateless. Government officials said
justifications for canceling the passports could only be shared with the
individuals affected, but international human rights groups alleged the
cancellations were politically motivated.
INTERNALLY DISPLACED
PERSONS (IDPS)
As part of the “Guca Nyakatsi” housing
program, in 2011 the government demolished approximately 47,000 rudimentary
grass-thatched huts deemed unsuitable for habitation and replaced them with mud
brick housing with corrugated metal roofs. According to the Community of
Rwandan Potters (COPORWA), an organization that focused primarily on Twa
community needs, the program disproportionately affected the Twa minority. At the
end of April, COPORWA claimed that 1,278 Twa families remained homeless without
replacement houses, and that 41percent of the new mud brick houses were
unfinished or of substandard construction. In September COPORWA reported as
many as 10 percent of Twa families forced to move into new housing were being
asked to pay rent despite a law requiring the government to provide such
housing to low-income citizens free of charge.
PROTECTION OF REFUGEES
Access to Asylum: The law provides for the granting of asylum
or refugee status, and the government has established a system for providing
protection to refugees.
The UNHCR, with government support, continued
to assist refugees and asylum seekers. At year’s end, it provided protection to
approximately 59,805 refugees, 99 percent of whom were from the DRC. Other
refugees were from Angola, Burundi, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia,
and Uganda.
In a joint effort by the UNHCR, Directorate
General of Immigration and Emigration, and Ministry of Disaster Management and
Refugee Affairs (MIDIMAR), all refugees underwent reregistration to verify the
size of the refugee population and expel Rwandan citizens and other
illegitimate claimants to refugee status from the camps. As a result of this
effort, the existing refugee population decreased from 55,654 to 43,443
refugees; however, due to renewed conflict in the eastern DRC, an additional
24,123 new individuals entered Rwanda between April 27 and year’s end, of whom
14,574 settled in the newly reopened Kigeme Refugee Camp and 3,318 awaited
processing at Nkamira Transit Center.
Refugee Abuse: Authorities failed to provide adequate
security or physical protection within refugee camps. The RNP stationed one
police officer part-time at each camp. Camp and RNP officials acknowledged the
camps faced higher crime rates than the rest of the country. Refugees were free
to file complaints with area police stations. While police issued arrest
warrants against some perpetrators, they refused to enter the camps to execute
warrants. Intimidation of police and victims by camp leaders contributed to a
general sense of impunity within the refugee community, especially in relation
to gender-based violence (GBV).
Human traffickers increasingly targeted
refugee youth, particularly girls, by offering jobs or education in Kigali,
Uganda, or elsewhere. Hundreds of newly arrived male Congolese refugees between
the ages of 13 and 29 left Nkamira Transit Center and Kigeme Refugee Camp to
join or rejoin the M23 armed group in the DRC. The M23 and its agents recruited
or forcibly conscripted dozens of young Congolese men and children from the
Gihembe, Kiziba, and Nyabiheke refugee camps (see sections 6 and 7.c.). In May
MIDIMAR published a camp code of conduct excluding a specific ban on armed
group recruitment despite repeated UNHCR proposals to include the standard
reference.
Employment: There were no laws restricting refugee employment, but few
were able to find jobs on the local economy. Refugee camps offered periodic job
training programs to assist refugees in finding or creating income-generating
opportunities.
Access to Basic Services: Refugees had access to public education,
public health care, public housing within the refugee camps, law enforcement,
courts and judicial procedures, and legal assistance. The government funded
primary education but did not provide tuition at the secondary and university
levels.
Durable Solutions: Rwanda is not a resettlement country for
refugees from third countries. The government assisted the safe, voluntary
return of refugees to their homes but did not facilitate local integration or
naturalization of refugees in protracted situations.
Temporary Protection: The government also provided temporary
protection to individual asylum seekers who might not qualify as refugees. It
provided temporary protection to 1,477 persons during the year.
The constitution and law provide citizens the
right to change their government peacefully; however, the ruling RPF controlled
the government and legislature, and its candidates continued to dominate
elections at all levels.
Recent Elections: Senate elections in September 2011 were
peaceful and orderly, with high turnout. International observers reported the
senate elections met the generally recognized standards of free and fair
elections in most respects but noted concerns regarding the independence of
voters’ decisions due to pressure or coercion. The elections were technically
“nonpartisan” in that candidates could not identify or take advantage of their
party affiliation during the campaign season and included numerous candidates.
Winning candidates typically received 80 percent of the vote. The RPF dominated
the senate elections, winning 11 of 14 seats up for election.
Political Parties: The constitution outlines a multiparty
system but provides few rights for parties and their candidates. There were
some reports the RPF pressured youth into joining the party during mandatory
ingando civic and military training camps held after secondary school
graduation. There were numerous reports RPF cadres coerced political donations
from both party members and nonmembers. Some parties were not able to operate
freely, and parties and candidates faced legal sanctions if found guilty of
engaging in divisive acts, destabilizing national unity, threatening
territorial integrity, or undermining national security. The government’s
enforcement of laws against genocide ideology, divisionism, and spreading false
information with intent to create a hostile international opinion against the
Rwandan state discouraged debate or criticism of the government and resulted in
occasional detentions.
The constitution requires all political organizations
to join the National Consultative Forum for Political Organizations, which
promoted consensus at the expense of political competition. To register as a
political party, an organization must demonstrate membership in every district,
reserve at least 30 percent of its leadership positions for women, and provide
a written party statute signed by a notary.
Attempts in 2009 and 2010 by the DGPR to
register were impeded. Government officials charged that DGPR president Frank
Habineza organized the party as a splinter group of the RPF with the support of
Ugandan intelligence. In 2010 DGPR vice president Andre Kagwa Rwisereka was
killed; the perpetrator(s) were neither identified nor punished. Following
Kagwa Rwisereka’s death, Habineza fled to Sweden, and the DGPR discontinued
activities in Rwanda. After rival politicians claimed he received an RPF bribe
to cease opposing the ruling party, Habineza returned to Rwanda on September 6.
During a September 13 press conference, he introduced a new executive committee,
presented the party platform, and declared his intent to register the DGPR and
compete in the September 2013 parliamentary elections. Government officials
again impeded DGPR efforts to register in November 2012 (see section 2.b.).
Police arbitrarily arrested some members of
the DGPR, the unregistered faction of PS-Imberakuri, and of FDU-Inkingi, which
remained unregistered, and members reported receiving threats because of their
association with those parties. A number of members of unregistered political
parties fled the country during the year.
On September 5, unidentified persons kidnapped
the vice president of the unregistered faction of PS-Imberakuri (see section
1.b.). On September 15, Rutsiro District police arrested eight members of
FDU-Inkingi. According to party leadership, police interrogated the detainees
about FDU-Inkingi’s plans for the 2013 parliamentary elections, funding
sources, and planned activities. The lawyer initially hired by FDU-Inkingi for
their defense withdrew after local police reportedly threatened him, and the
prosecution arraigned the eight party members during the interim, charging them
with inciting insurrection or trouble among the populace. According to the
NPPA, the party members had attended an illegal meeting of an unregistered
political party. In November police arrested the DGPR coordinator for Kirehe
District and five DGPR party members in Musanze and Rutsiro Districts for
recruiting new members, which is not an offense under the law. Police released
the five members after senior party officials reportedly agreed to submit
themselves to questioning, without a lawyer, about DGPR political activities,
but held the Kirehe District party coordinator in illegal detention for three
weeks without charge or presentation in court.
In accordance with the constitution, which
states a majority party in the Chamber of Deputies may not fill more than 50
percent of cabinet positions, independents and members of other political
parties held key positions in government including that of prime minister.
PS-Imberakuri was the only registered political party not represented in the
cabinet.
Participation of Women and Minorities: The constitution requires at least 30
percent of the seats in Parliament’s Chamber of Deputies be reserved for women.
At year’s end there were nine women in the 26-seat Senate and 47 women in the
80-seat Chamber of Deputies. Women filled seven of 26 cabinet positions.
There was one member of the Twa minority in
the Senate and none in the Chamber of Deputies or cabinet.
The law provides criminal penalties for
corruption by officials, and the government continued to make implementation of
these laws a national priority; however, corruption remained a problem.
In a controversial March report, an ad hoc
parliamentary committee charged Minister of Finance and Economic Planning John
Rwangomba and eight other senior government officials of mismanaging the Rukara
hydropower dam project. The parliamentary investigation followed the
publication of an article in The New Times newspaper, which
had claimed that in 2011 Minister of Local Government James Musoni had
illegally awarded public tenders to the local company Digitech Solutions (now
known as Ngali Holdings). Rwangomba and the other officials protested the
report’s findings as inaccurate and poorly researched, and in August the
parliamentary committee of public accounts cleared the nine officials of any
wrongdoing. The parliamentary disciplinary committee subsequently investigated
the seven members of the ad hoc parliamentary committee for misconduct, and the
Office of the Auditor General opened a new investigation into the project.
On July 21, police arrested Musoni’s permanent
secretary in MINALOC, Cyrille Turatsinze, and a coaccused for allegedly
accepting a bribe of two million Rwandan francs ($3,175) on another public
tender. On August 10, the Nyarugenge Intermediate Court acquitted Turatsinze
and his coaccused because they were not on the MINALOC committee that approved
tenders.
As of July the NPPA reported prosecuting 342
civil servants, including unidentified financial controllers, heads of
institutions, and members of internal tender committees, for fraud, illegal
awarding of public tenders, and mismanagement of public assets. The government
issued 134.4 million Rwandan francs ($213,335) in fines and successfully
prosecuted 75 individuals, resulting in prison terms of up to eight years as
well as fines. Prosecutors continued to investigate some cases and scheduled
others for trial.
The constitution and law require annual
reporting of income and assets by public officials, as well as reporting upon
entry and exit of office, but there is no requirement for public disclosure of
those assets except in cases of discovered irregularities. The Office of the
Ombudsman, which monitors and verifies disclosures, reported most officials
complied with this requirement. In cases of noncompliance, the Office of the
Ombudsman has the power to impose administrative sanctions, which often
involved loss of position or prosecution.
The NPPA, under MINIJUST, is responsible for
prosecuting police abuse cases. The RNP Inspectorate of Services investigated
cases of police misconduct, but statistics were not available for 2012. The RNP
suspended police officers for corruption, abuse of power, or misconduct and
imposed administrative punishment for indiscipline. The RNP referred criminal
offenses committed by police to the NPPA, and several prosecutions were
underway at year’s end. The RNP advertised a toll-free hotline number in the
local radio and press and provided complaint and compliment boxes in many
communities to encourage citizens to report both positive and negative behavior
by police and LDF.
The Office of the Auditor General worked to
prevent corruption, including by investigations of improper tendering practices
at government ministries. The RNP and the NPPA used the auditor general’s
annual report to pursue investigations into government businesses. The Office
of the Ombudsman led the National Anti-Corruption Council and had an active
good governance program and several local-level anticorruption units. The
office pursued many corruption cases, the majority of which involved misuse of
public funds. The Rwanda Governance Board (RGB) monitored good governance more
broadly and promoted mechanisms to control corruption. The Rwanda Revenue
Authority’s Anti-Corruption Unit had a code of conduct and an active mechanism
for internal discipline. The National Tender Board, Rwanda Utilities Regulatory
Agency, and the National Bureau of Standards also enforced regulations. The law
incorporates whistleblower protections and stipulates whoever provides
information on acts of corruption and related offenses will benefit monetarily.
The law does not provide for access to government information, and it was
difficult for citizens and foreigners, including journalists, to obtain access
to government information; however, the annual budget was available publicly,
both in electronic form and in print.
The government utilized a “bagging and
tagging” system to aid companies with regional and international due diligence
requirements related to conflict minerals. The government maintained a ban on
the purchase or sale of undocumented minerals from neighboring countries.
According to a June 21 UNGOE interim report on the DRC, the government
tightened border controls after a December 2011 UNGOE report alluded to SSF
complicity in the smuggling of conflict minerals. However, observers and
government officials reported smugglers succeeded in trafficking an
unquantifiable amount of undocumented minerals through the country, while the
UNGOE, Global Witness, The Enough Project, and other international NGOs
reported SSF remained complicit in smuggling and illegally tagging conflict
minerals.
In March the Geology and Mines Department
(GMD) suspended for six months Semico mining company and two unnamed companies
for fraudulently tagging minerals. At the same time, the International Tin
Research Institute (ITRI) Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi) suspended
exporter Africa Primary Tungsten (APT) for six months for buying tags from
Semico mining company to tag illegally conflict minerals on the APT compound.
The GMD referred APT to the police for investigation. According to ITRI and the
international NGO Pact, some of the country’s highest ranking mining officials
were complicit in the fraudulent tagging scheme, and lack of prompt enforcement
allowed the guilty parties to sell 70 metric tons of untagged tungsten on the
market after the violation was documented.
On June 29, Global Witness reported General
Bosco Ntaganda and “other senior members of the M23 amassed huge sums of money
through the trade in conflict minerals.” According to the Global Witness press
release, M23 leaders smuggled coltan (tantalum) and tin ore across the border
and marketed them internationally as “Rwandan goods--while the authorities in
Kigali have turned a blind eye.” The Enough Project reported a Congolese court
convicted an ex- CNDP officer and two bodyguards on October 10 of robbing
trucks carrying minerals and attempting to smuggle two metric tons of coltan
into Rwanda on October 7. In a November 20 press release, Global Witness
announced it had evidence M23 controlled mines in Masisi, DRC, from which
minerals were smuggled into Rwanda in October and certified for export as
domestic production.
In its November 15 final report, the UNGOE
implicated specific senior RDF and NISS officials (Gen. James Kabarebe, Head of
J-2 Military Intelligence Brig. Gen. Richard Rutatina, and NISS Director of
External Security Col. Dan Munyuza) in minerals smuggling from the DRC in
concert with Gen. Bosco Ntaganda, the M23, and private Congolese traders. On
January 17, the government placed four senior RDF and NISS officials (RDF
Reserve Force Commander Lt. Gen. Fred Ibingira, Brig. Gen. Richard Rutatina,
Third Division Commander Brig. Gen. Wilson Gumurusizi, and Col. Dan Munyuza)
under temporary house arrest, but did not publicly link the arrests to minerals
smuggling and never charged any of the four with any crime. Many observers
claimed the four were involved with Gen. Bosco Ntaganda’s smuggling network,
and the UNGOE stated that explicitly in its final report. The UNGOE further
reported the smuggling of primarily tin, tantalum, and tungsten across land
borders with the DRC, across Lake Kivu, and by air. The November 15 final
report described the fraudulent tagging of Congolese minerals through the
illegal purchase of tags issued by mining cooperatives with unused or underused
concessions in western Rwanda. In addition to a number of mining cooperatives
and mineral export houses, the UNGOE implicated the company Alpha Minerals in
fraudulent tagging schemes, as well as Global Mining Company, which was run by Eddy
Habimana, a relative of Gen. James Kabarebe.
SECTION 5. GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE REGARDING
INTERNATIONAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS
Several domestic and international human
rights groups operated in the country, investigating and publishing their
findings on human rights cases. Some human rights groups reported government
officials generally were cooperative and responsive to their privately
expressed views; however, others indicated the government was intolerant of
criticism and suspicious of local and international human rights observers,
often rejecting their criticism as biased and uninformed. During the year most
human rights NGOs expressed fear of the government and self-censored their
activities and comments.
A few domestic NGOs, including LIPRODHOR,
AJPRODHO-JIJUKIRWA, ARDHO, and the League for Human Rights in the Great Lakes
Region (LDGL), focused on human rights abuses. LIPRODHOR and LDGL scaled back
programs and investigations during the year, reportedly because of government
pressure. LIPRODHOR’s president, who received death threats in 2011, stepped
down early in the year and refused to speak further on human rights issues. In
July LIPRODHOR’s executive secretary left the country and did not return. The
former executive secretaries of LIPRODHOR and LDGL remained outside the
country. There were several reports SSF pressured other members of LIPRODHOR
and LDGL to quit those organizations.
A progovernment NGO, the Civil Society
Platform, managed and directed some NGOs through umbrella groups, which
theoretically aggregated NGOs working in particular thematic sectors. Many
observers believed the government controlled some of these groups. In July, 22
local NGOs established the Rwanda Network of Human Rights Defenders as an
alternative sector umbrella group; however, some NGO leaders expressed concern
the government would maintain control over the new umbrella group through its
president.
The Collective of Leagues and Associations for
the Defense of Human Rights (CLADHO), which LIPRODHOR and LDGL accused in 2010
of having been taken over by government agents, attempted to reassert itself in
July through the election of a new executive committee during its general
assembly. Former Mufti Sheik Saleh Habimana, the RGB Head of Political Parties,
NGOs, and Religious Organizations, rejected certification for CLADHO’s new
executive committee and forced new elections after the new committee announced
it would investigate the decisions of the former executive secretary. After
CLADHO members again elected the same new executive committee, Habimana
reportedly worked with the former executive secretary to have a court case
filed that would force an injunction against the new executive committee taking
office. Several domestic and international NGOs criticized Habimana’s actions
as unlawful interference that was politically motivated.
During the year the government passed two new
NGO laws. The law on local NGOs moves their oversight from MINALOC to the RGB
and replaces annual registration with one-time registration and required
submission of annual budgets and reports. It allows local NGOs to lobby for
political causes but not candidates, and permits government funding in exchange
for greater government control over budgets and activities. Local NGOs welcomed
the advent of one-time registration and permission to advocate for their
causes, but also worried the new law would serve to increase government
interference and control of programming. The new law on international NGOs
allows for registration in up to five-year increments depending on the duration
of the NGO’s present funding, but oversight remains with the Directorate
General of Immigration and Emigration, which falls under NISS. International
NGOs widely criticized the new law. The Directorate General of Immigration and
Emigration generated even more concern among international NGOs by immediately
seeking to roll back the law’s limited reforms through a controversial
ministerial order.
Local and international NGOs often found the
registration process difficult in part because they must present their
objectives, plan of action, and detailed financial information to the local
authorities of every district in which they would like to work. NGOs of all
sizes complained these requirements strained their limited resources. The
government threatened legal action against organizations that did not submit
reports or registration paperwork on time. Many international NGOs and some
local NGOs complained government delays and unpublished requirements caused
late submissions and the regulatory environment worsened during the year.
UN and Other International or NGO Humanitarian
Bodies: The government
sometimes cooperated with international human rights NGOs; however, it
criticized HRW, Reporters Without Borders, Freedom House, and Amnesty
International, as well as the UN and several of its agencies, as being
inaccurate and biased. The government reportedly conducted surveillance on
certain international and domestic NGOs. Some NGOs reported authorities
pressured individuals affiliated with them to provide information on their
activities, and several NGOs expressed concerns intelligence agents infiltrated
their organizations with intent to gather information or create internal
problems. Some local staff members of HRW reported receiving death threats from
SSF for their work on human rights issues. On February 9, the Karongi District
labor inspector and officials from MIDIMAR and the Directorate General of
Immigration and Emigration physically threatened and intimidated expatriate
staff members of the American Refugee Committee for firing corrupt Rwandan
employees; the government took no corrective action after receiving complaints.
Several international organizations complained
the Directorate General of Immigration and Emigration used ministerial orders
to roll back legal reforms, improperly deny visas to personnel, further
complicate registration requirements, and establish government control over all
facets of NGO activities and internal management. There were isolated reports
of government officials asking international NGOs to hand over their assets,
programs, and staff to local NGOs and government agencies.
Government Human Rights Bodies: The independent and adequately funded Office
of the Ombudsman operated with the cooperation of executive agencies and took
action on cases of corruption and other abuses, including of human rights (see
sections 1.e. and 4).
The government cooperated with the National
Human Rights Commission (NHRC); however, the NHRC did not have adequate
resources to investigate all reported violations and remained biased in favor
of the government, according to many observers.
On June 29, the ICTR, based in Tanzania,
terminated its activities; on July 2, it turned over its remaining genocide
cases to a Tanzania-based branch of the MICT. The MICT continued to prosecute
genocide suspects. From 1994 through 2012, the ICTR completed 73 cases, with 47
convictions, 16 convictions pending appeal, and 10 acquittals. At year’s end
there were nine fugitives. Before its closure the ICTR approved the transfer of
two detainees and six of the nine fugitive cases to Rwanda. The ICTR neither
indicted nor tried any RPF members during its existence.
The constitution provides that all citizens
are equal before the law, without discrimination based on ethnic origin, tribe,
clan, color, sex, region, social origin, religion or faith opinion, economic
status, culture, language, social status, or physical or mental disability. The
constitution and law are silent on sexual orientation and gender identity. The
government generally enforced these provisions; however, problems remained.
Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalizes rape and spousal rape,
and the government handled rape cases as a judicial priority. Penalties for
rape ranged from five years’ to life imprisonment, with fines of 500,000 to one
million Rwandan francs ($795 to $1,590). Penalties for spousal rape ranged from
two months’ to life imprisonment, with fines of 100,000 to 300,000 Rwandan
francs ($160 to $475). Prosecutors reported opening 351 cases of adult rape. Of
those 351 cases, 109 were filed in court, 143 were dropped, and 99 were pending
investigation. From January to September, the courts adjudicated 65 cases (70
individuals) of adult rape, convicting 53 and acquitting 17. Among those
convicted, the courts sentenced four to life in prison. Rape and other crimes
of sexual violence committed during the genocide are classified as Category I
genocide crimes.
The law provides for imprisonment of three to
six months for threatening, harassing, or beating one’s spouse; however,
domestic violence against women was common. Most incidents remained within the
extended family and were not reported or prosecuted. UNICEF reported in 2010
that 48 percent of adolescent females thought a husband was justified in
hitting or beating his wife under certain circumstances. Figures from the
National Institute of Statistics from 2006 indicated 31 percent of women and
girls over the age of 15 were victims of domestic violence, and 10 percent of
women and girls experienced domestic violence during pregnancy. From January to
September, prosecutors received 365 cases of spousal harassment, exclusive of
other forms of GBV, of which 163 were filed in court, 26 were dropped, four
were reclassified, and 172 were pending investigation. From January to
September, the courts adjudicated 117 cases (119 individuals) of spousal harassment,
convicting 115 and acquitting four.
Police headquarters in Kigali had a hotline
for domestic violence. Several other government ministries also had free GBV
hotlines. Each of the 75 police stations nationwide had its own gender desk, an
average of three trained officers, and a public outreach program. The RNP
Directorate of Anti-GBV, established in October 2011, handled all cases of GBV
and child protection. The Isange Center provided one-stop medical,
psychological, legal, and police assistance at no cost to victims of domestic
violence at Kaciryu Police Hospital in Kigali. Five public district hospitals
operated small-scale one-stop centers, four of which opened in 2012.
During the year the RDF participated in a
national campaign entitled “16 Days of Activism to Fight GBV.” The country
hosted a UN training course on Investigation and Prevention of Sexual and
Gender-Based Crimes at the Rwanda Peace Academy in Musanze District, which drew
participants from 16 countries that contribute police to UN missions. The
country also hosted the Africa Security Organs Annual Review Meeting on
Prevention of Violence against Women and Girls, which adopted recommendations
aimed at strengthening awareness, prevention, and response to GBV. The
government continued a whole-of-government, multistakeholder campaign against
GBV, child abuse, and other types of domestic violence. GBV was a required
module of training for all police and military at all levels.
In its November 15 final report, the UNGOE
reported M23 and RDF involvement in sexual violence in the DRC. For example,
according to the report, the RDF captured a Rwandan M23 deserter in Kinigi,
Rwanda, brought him back to the M23 in the DRC, and then forced him to rape a
girl in front of the other troops.
Sexual Harassment: The law prohibits sexual harassment by
employers or any other person and provides for penalties of two months’ to two
years’ imprisonment and fines from 100,000 to 500,000 Rwandan francs ($160 to
$795). Nevertheless, sexual harassment remained common. According to a 2010
Transparency Rwanda study, gender-based corruption was perceived as being
fundamentally linked to recruitment practices and to the determination of
salary and other benefits; 21 percent of female respondents believed their
salary determination was not objective, and some claimed their salaries were
determined by their willingness to have sex with company executives. The study
also found, by contrast, promotion, evaluation, and opportunities for training
or travel were based on more objective and transparent criteria. Fifty-six
percent of interviewees said they did not report gender-based corruption cases.
The effectiveness of government enforcement efforts was unknown.
Reproductive Rights: The government encouraged citizens not to
have more than three children but respected the right of couples and
individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing, and timing of
children and to have the information and means to do so free from
discrimination, coercion, and violence. The government made available
reproductive health services and contraceptives for all citizens, regardless of
age, sex, and ethnicity. More than 90 percent of the population had some form
of health insurance, with free coverage provided to the poorest of the population.
Insurance plans did not provide adequate coverage for more expensive medical
care.
There was a small copayment for obstetric
services, but this fee was waived for women who completed the recommended four
prenatal care visits. Women and men received equal access to diagnostic
services and treatment for sexually transmitted infections. According to the
UN, the estimated maternal mortality ratio in 2010 was 340 maternal deaths per
100,000 live births. Major factors influencing maternal mortality included lack
of skilled attendance at birth and unhygienic conditions. Between 2008 and
2010, the UN reported the use of modern contraceptives increased from 26
percent to 44 percent. Between 2005 and 2010, skilled attendance at birth rose
from 39 to 69 percent, according to the 2010 Demographic and Health Survey. The
proportion of assisted births at health facilities increased from 45 percent in
2007-08 to 69 percent in 2010.
Discrimination: Women have the same legal status and are
entitled to the same rights as men. The law allows women to inherit property
from their fathers and husbands, and couples may make their own legal property
arrangements; however, women had serious difficulties pursuing property claims
due to lack of knowledge, gender bias in inheritance issues, polygyny, and the
threat of GBV. After the 1994 genocide, which left many women as heads of
households, women assumed a larger role in the formal sector, and many operated
their own businesses. According to the National Institute of Statistics August
2012 Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey, 28 percent of households
were headed by females, and 47 percent of female-headed households were below
the poverty line, compared to 45 percent of all households. Women were more
concentrated in the agricultural sector, with 82 percent of women engaged in
agricultural work, compared with 61 percent of men. The other main occupations
in which women found work were sales and commerce, where similar proportions of
men and women were engaged. Despite the election in 2008 of a Chamber of
Deputies with a female majority, women continued to have limited opportunities
for employment and promotion. According to the Ministry of Industry and
Commerce 2011 Establishment Census, women managed approximately 26 percent of
all formal enterprises; however, men owned key assets of most households,
particularly those at the lower end of the economic spectrum, making formal
bank credit inaccessible to many women and rendering it difficult to start or
expand a business.
The government-funded National Women’s Council
served as a forum for women’s issues and consulted with the government on land,
inheritance, and child protection laws. MIGEPROF led government programs to
address women’s issues and coordinated programs with other ministries, police,
and NGOs, including the National Action Plan for the Implementation of UN
Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security. The government
provided scholarships for girls in primary and secondary school and loans to rural
women. A number of women’s groups actively promoted women’s and children’s
concerns, particularly those of widows, orphaned girls, and households headed
by children. The government-run Gender Monitoring Office tracked the
mainstreaming of gender equality and women’s empowerment throughout all sectors
of society and collected gender-disaggregated data to inform policy processes.
Birth Registration: Citizenship is derived from one’s parents.
Children born to two Rwandan parents automatically receive citizenship.
Children with one Rwandan parent must apply for citizenship before turning 18
years old. Children born in the country to unknown or stateless parents
automatically receive citizenship. Minor children adopted by Rwandans,
irrespective of foreign nationality or statelessness, automatically receive
citizenship. Children retain their acquired nationality in the event of
dissolution of the parents’ marriage. Births are registered at the sector level
upon presentation of a medical birth certificate. Anecdotal evidence indicated
low prevalence of birth registration due to complex procedures and associated
penalties for late registration. There were no reports of unregistered births
leading to denial of public services.
Education: Six years of primary education and three years of secondary
education are compulsory. The government implemented a 12-year Basic Education
Program in January to extend free universal public education by three
additional years of secondary education. Parents are not required to pay
tuition fees through the 12 years of basic education; however, most parents
were required to pay unofficial fees to support basic school operations.
Child Abuse: Statistics on child abuse were unreliable; however, such abuse
was common within the family, in the village, at school, and by law
enforcement. From January to September, prosecutors reported opening only 35
cases of child abuse. Of those 35 cases, 22 were thereafter filed in court, two
were dropped, and 11 were pending investigation. Conviction statistics were not
available. The government continued a high-profile public awareness campaign
against GBV and child abuse during the year. The government trained 4,143 law
enforcement and local officials on GBV and child abuse during Women’s and
Girls’ Month from March 8 to April 5.
The Isange Center and five public hospital
one-stop centers treated victims of GBV and child abuse. The Gihundwe One-Stop
Center in Rusizi District treated 285 such victims in its first year of
existence from September 2010 to September 2011. Center officials reported 45
percent of the victims were minors, and that 55 percent of victims reported
sexual violence and 45 percent reported domestic violence.
Child Marriage: The minimum age for marriage is 21. Between
2000 and 2010, UNICEF reported an under-18 child marriage rate of 13 percent.
Anecdotal evidence suggested child marriage was more common in rural areas and
refugee camps than in urban areas.
Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law provides that any sexual relations
involving a child under 18 years old is considered child defilement and is
punishable by life in prison and a fine of 100,000 to one million Rwandan
francs ($160 to $1,590). The director of Nyagatare Juvenile Rehabilitation
Center reported the majority of juvenile detainees were serving time for child
defilement (statutory rape), usually six-month sentences. Noting an increase in
child sexual abuse and exploitation, UNICEF reported in October child heads of
household, especially girls, were increasingly coerced into selling sex in
exchange for money, basic goods, or protection. Prosecutors received 2,064
cases of child defilement, of which 843 were filed in court, 655 were dropped,
three were reclassified, and 566 were pending investigation. From January to
September, the courts adjudicated 570 cases (589 individuals) of child
defilement, convicting 466 and acquitting 123. Among those convicted, the
courts sentenced 41 to life in prison.
During the year the government continued a
high-profile public campaign to discourage intergenerational sex and sexual
procurement.
The law prohibits commercial sexual
exploitation of children and child pornography, with penalties of between six
months and seven years in prison and a fine of 500,000 to 20 million Rwandan
francs ($795 to $31,745). Police reported investigating one case of forcing a
child into prostitution. Conviction statistics were not available.
Child Soldiers: There were several reports the M23 armed
group and its agents forcibly recruited dozens of Rwandan children as young as
12, as well as Congolese refugee children from Nkamira Transit Center in Rubavu
District and from Rwanda’s four refugee camps, to porter goods, collect
intelligence, cook, provide sex, serve as bodyguards, and fight on the front lines
in the eastern DRC (see sections 2.d. and 7.c.). For example, a mother living
at Kiziba Refugee Camp reported to UNHCR, RNP, and NPPA her minor son was
forcibly recruited. Government authorities took no action, and in September the
woman reported being followed and intimidated by unknown persons. Two minor M23
recruits who escaped told UN interviewers that they and one of their friends
had been taken from Kiziba and promised good jobs in the DRC, but then forced
into military service. According to the UNHCR and refugee mothers, the M23 took
children as young as 13 from Nkamira. Officials representing the Directorate
General of Immigration and Emigration and MIDIMAR refused to countersign or
acknowledge refugee statements made during registration and reregistration
exercises to the effect that the disappearances and forced recruitment
occurred.
The government continued to support the
Musanze Child Rehabilitation Center in Northern Province, relocated during the
year from Muhazi, Eastern Province, which provided care and social
reintegration preparation for 66 children who had previously served in armed
groups in the DRC. Of those former child soldiers, 53 were reunited with their
families. The center provided literacy and numeric education, psychosocial support,
recreational and cultural activities, medical care, and agricultural vocational
training.
The UNGOE in its November 15 final report
stated the RDRC sent ex-FDLR child soldiers back to the DRC to fight alongside
the M23. For example, the UNGOE reported that on August 15 Frank Musonero, RDRC
center director for Mutobo, sent five ex-FDLR child soldiers between the ages
of 13 and 16 to Kinigi, where RDF troops forced them to carry ammunition and
join the M23.
Displaced Children: There were numerous street children
throughout the country. Authorities gathered street children in transit centers
and placed them in rehabilitation centers. Street children processed in one of
MIGEPROF’s two transit centers or in the sole church-run transit center
benefited from better social worker screening than those detained at Kigali
City’s Gikondo Transit Center, where conditions and screening were substandard
(see section 1.d.). The National Commission for Children (NCC) provided
psychological counseling, education, and vocational training to 161 former
street children ages nine to 16 at Gitagata Child Rehabilitation Center, the
only government-run center for street children. According to center officials,
70 percent of children at Gitagata became street children as a result of
poverty, 20 percent because they were orphaned, and 10 percent due to family
conflict. The dilapidated but spacious center mandated a one-year stay, after
which children could be reintegrated with their families or paired with foster
homes. Conditions and practices varied at 29 privately run rehabilitation
centers for street children.
Institutionalized Children: As part of government plans to downsize and
eventually phase out orphanages, the NCC reported it reintegrated 622 orphans
with families between March and May and closed the three worst-performing
government-run orphanages. Management of orphanages and Gitagata transferred
from MIGEPROF to the newly formed NCC during the year. UNICEF reported the
remaining 30 government-run and one privately run child-care institutions
provided shelter, basic needs, and rehabilitation for 3,153 orphans and street
children. According to the NCC, 70 percent of children in orphanages were not
orphans but had either run away or been abandoned by their families. The government
worked with international organizations and NGOs to provide vocational training
and psychosocial support to orphans and street children, reintegrate them into
their communities, and educate parents on how to prevent their children from
becoming street children.
International Child Abductions: The country is not a party to the 1980 Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.
There was a very small Jewish community,
consisting entirely of foreigners, and there were no reports of anti-Semitic
acts.
See the Department of State’s Trafficking
in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip.
The law prohibits discrimination against
persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, and mental disabilities regarding
employment, education, air travel and other transportation, access to health
care, and the provision of other state services, and the government generally
enforced these provisions. The law also mandates access to public facilities,
accommodations for taking national exams, provision of medical care by the
government, and monitoring of implementation by the NHRC. The government
generally implemented all of the foregoing provisions. Despite a continuing
campaign to enable persons with disabilities to have a barrier-free
environment, accessibility remained a problem throughout the country.
Few students with disabilities reached the
university level because many primary and secondary schools were unable to
accommodate their disabilities. Many children with disabilities did not attend
primary or secondary school. The Ministry of Education and UNICEF collaborated
to train teachers to be more sensitive in responding to the needs of children
with disabilities. For example, Murama Primary School in Bugesera District
appointed a UNICEF-supported special needs education coordinator for students
with hearing and speech disabilities and waived lunch and school supply
expenses for children with disabilities as an incentive to keep them in school.
Institutes of higher education admitted students with disabilities, but only
the National University of Rwanda and the Kigali Institute of Education were
able to accommodate students with visual disabilities.
There was one government psychiatric referral
hospital in Kigali, with district hospitals providing limited psychiatric
services. All other mental health facilities were nongovernmental. In general
facilities were underequipped and understaffed. Individuals can be committed by
a judge to Ndera Psychiatric Hospital involuntarily but must be referred by
district officials after counseling and consultations with family members.
Gikondo Transit Center officials reported committing detainees to Ndera involuntarily
and without review of any kind.
Some citizens viewed disability as a curse or
punishment, which could result in social exclusion and sometimes abandonment or
hiding of children from the community. In January UNICEF reported the 2010
MINALOC census found that despite legislative improvements, persons with
disabilities, particularly children, continued to face discrimination and
stigma. According to a February Handicap International Rwanda research
document, the prevailing cultural stereotype was that persons with disabilities
could only survive through begging and dependence.
There were numerous claims of employment
discrimination against persons with disabilities. For example, the School of
Finance and Banking appointed a recent graduate of the school to join the
university faculty because of her high examination score but fired her on her
third day of work because she was deaf. The National Union of Disability
Organizations in Rwanda (NUDOR) worked with the National Council for Persons
with Disabilities (NCPD) on the resolution of such claims.
During the year there were several reports of
violence against persons with disabilities. Police were sometimes less
responsive if the victim had disabilities. For example, NUDOR reported police
failed to pursue the case of a deaf woman in Nyanza District who became
pregnant and contracted HIV as a result of rape. NUDOR claimed police failed to
pursue the case because of the victim’s disability.
From November 26 to December 3, the NCPD
organized the second annual Disability Week, culminating in the second National
Day of Children with Disabilities and the International Day of Persons with
Disabilities to sensitize citizens to problems faced by persons with
disabilities.
The NCPD, which assisted government efforts to
provide for the rights of persons with disabilities, designated one member with
disabilities in the Chamber of Deputies. NUDOR provided an umbrella civil
society platform for advocacy on behalf of persons with disabilities. A
disabilities coordination forum was organized every trimester. During the year
the Ministry of Health formed a Department of Injuries and Disabilities within
the Non-Communicable Diseases Division of the Rwanda Biomedical Center.
Persons with mental disabilities were required
to submit a medical certificate before they were allowed to vote. Some
disabilities advocates complained that requirements for electoral candidates to
hold secondary education diplomas or higher degrees, depending on position,
disadvantaged persons with disabilities.
Longstanding tensions in the country
culminated in the 1994 state-orchestrated genocide, in which Rwandans killed
between 750,000 and one million of their fellow citizens, including
approximately three-quarters of the Tutsi population. Following the killing of
the president in 1994, an extremist interim government directed the
Hutu-dominated national army, militia groups, and ordinary citizens to kill
resident Tutsis and moderate Hutus. The genocide ended later the same year when
the predominantly Tutsi RPF, operating out of Uganda and northern Rwanda,
defeated the national army and Hutu militias and established an RPF-led
government of national unity that included members of eight political parties.
President Kagame was elected in the 2003 elections.
Since 1994 the government has called for
national reconciliation and abolished policies of the former government that
created and deepened ethnic cleavages. The government removed all references to
ethnicity in written and nonwritten official discourse and eliminated ethnic
quotas for education, training, and government employment. The constitution
provides for the eradication of ethnic, regional, and other divisions in
society and the promotion of national unity. In practice most Rwandans know the
regional or ethnic origin of their fellow Rwandans. Some individuals continued
to accuse the government of favoring Tutsis, particularly English-speaking
Tutsis, in government employment, admission to professional schooling, recruitment
into or promotion within the army, and other matters.
Beginning in the 1920s, colonial authorities
formally assigned “racial” categories to all citizens and required them to
carry identity cards indicating their designated ethnicity: Hutu, Tutsi, or
Twa. Government authorities continued this practice until after the 1994
genocide. The postgenocide government banned identity card references to
ethnicity and prohibited social or political organizations based on ethnic
affiliation as divisionist or contributing to genocide ideology. As a result,
the Twa, purported descendants of Pygmy tribes of the mountainous forest areas
bordering the DRC and numbering approximately 34,000, lost their official
designation as an ethnic group. The government no longer recognizes groups
advocating specifically for Twa needs, and some Twa believed these government
policies denied them their rights as an indigenous ethnic group; however, the
government recognized COPORWA, an organization that focused primarily on Twa
community needs, as an advocate for the most marginalized. Most Twa continued
to live on the margins of society with very limited access to health care or
education and were viewed generally as second-class citizens by other Rwandans
(see section 2.d.).
Societal
Abuses, Discrimination, and Acts of Violence Based on Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity
There are no laws that criminalize sexual
orientation or consensual same-sex sexual conduct; however, lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals reported societal discrimination
and abuse. In April 2011 local LGBT rights group Horizon Community Association
(HOCA) opened an office in Kigali but was evicted in August 2011 after the
landlord reported pressure from neighbors. HOCA leaders and staff reported
receiving threats in 2011, and several fled the country. HOCA did not reopen
its office during the year; however, two other local LGBT rights groups--My
Rights and Other Sheep--opened offices in Kigali and Rubavu District without incident.
Unlike in the previous year, there were no
known reports of physical attacks against LGBT persons. In previous years LGBT
victims of such attacks fled the country and were granted asylum abroad. The
RNP investigated reports of threats to LGBT activists and individuals, but the
outcome of such investigations was unknown.
Discrimination against persons living with
HIV/AIDS occurred, although such incidents remained rare. According to a June
report by AJPRODHO-JIJUKIRWA, persons living with HIV/AIDS often were denied
the right to inheritance in the belief they would die soon. The government
actively supported public education campaigns on the issue, including the
establishment of HIV/AIDS awareness clubs in secondary schools and making
public pronouncements against stigmatization of those with the disease.
According to RDF policy and in keeping with UN
guidelines, members of the military with HIV/AIDS were not permitted to
participate in peacekeeping missions abroad but could remain in the military.
The law provides all salaried formal sector
workers, except for certain senior public servants and soldiers, the right to form
and join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively.
Family businesses and informal sector workers generally are not protected under
most provisions of the labor code. Other provisions of law sometimes abrogated
these rights. For example, a ministerial order that identifies essential
services severely restricts the fields in which workers have the right to
strike.
All unions must register with the Ministry of
Public Service and Labor (MIFOTRA). The application process was cumbersome and
required unions to disclose their membership and property.
The law provides some workers the right to
conduct strikes, subject to numerous restrictions. Public servants and soldiers
are not allowed to strike, and participation in unauthorized demonstrations can
result in employee dismissal, nonpayment of wages, and civil action against the
union. A union’s executive committee must approve any strike, and the union
must first try to resolve its differences with management through complex,
compulsory arbitration, conciliation, and mediation processes prescribed by
MIFOTRA.
The law allows unions to negotiate with
employers for an industry-level minimum wage in certain sectors, but none did
so. The law allows unions to conduct their activities without interference,
prohibits antiunion discrimination, and requires employers to reinstate workers
fired for union activity. Antiunion interference and discrimination are subject
to penalties of up to two months in prison and fines of 50,000 to 300,000
Rwandan francs ($80 to $475), which were not sufficient to deter violations.
The labor code restricts voluntary collective bargaining by inserting the
government into labor negotiations and requiring binding arbitration in cases
of nonconciliation.
Freedom of association and the right to
collective bargaining generally were not respected in practice. The government
did not enforce applicable laws effectively and restricted these rights in
practice. Government-led aggregation of small and medium enterprises into sector-specific
cooperatives precluded unionization and led to the shutdown of unions. In
addition, local government officials and employers routinely impeded workers
from joining or forming unions. Employers often harassed union members and
prevented workers from meeting by prohibiting meetings during work hours.
Employers often dismissed union representatives and members as a result of
their union activities and did not reinstate them.
The government severely limited the right to
collective bargaining. The government was heavily involved in the collective
bargaining process since most union members worked in the public sector. Labor
union officials commented that many private sector businesses controlled by the
RPF or RDF were off-limits to collective bargaining negotiations. The
government also controlled collective bargaining with cooperatives. No labor
unions had an established collective bargaining agreement with the government.
Employers, including the government, perpetually delayed agreements to bargain or
bargained with employer-controlled unions. Employers across a number of
industries, such as mining and construction, employed subcontractors in order
to avoid hiring workers with bargaining rights or paying legally required
benefits.
In January tea company Sorwathe became the
first company in Rwanda to sign a collective bargaining agreement with its
employees, who numbered 2,400. The Central Union of Rwandan Workers (CESTRAR),
the Congress of Labor and Brotherhood, and MIFOTRA participated in the negotiations.
In contrast to prior years, there were no
registered strikes in 2012, nor anecdotal evidence of unlawful strikes.
There were no functioning labor courts or
other formal mechanisms to resolve antiunion discrimination complaints.
According to CESTRAR, employers in small companies frequently intimidated
unionists through the use of transfers, demotions, and dismissals.
The law prohibits most forms of forced or
compulsory labor, and the government generally enforced the law. In May the
government signed into law a new penal code greatly strengthening
antitrafficking provisions. After acquitting one trafficking suspect of slavery
on January 20 for lack of evidence, the government convicted two Rwandan men of
slavery and sentenced them to five years in prison on August 8 after they
attempted to traffic four Rwandan women to China for prostitution under false
pretenses. Other forced labor cases may have been tried under different laws.
Government efforts to prevent and eliminate forced labor focused on trafficking
in persons and child labor (see section 7.c.). Statistics on the number of
victims removed from forced labor were not available.
However, forced labor, including forced child
labor, occurred in practice. Community leaders monitored participation in a
monthly community service day called “umuganda.” The government required
citizens to participate in three hours of umuganda community service and public
works per month as a way to bring the country together to rebuild from the 1994
genocide. There were reports some localities required umuganda more than once a
month. Jehovah’s Witnesses performed additional umuganda in exchange for
exemption from community night patrol commitments.
Also see the Department of State’s
annual Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip.
The minimum age for full-time employment is 18
(16 for apprenticeships), provided the child has completed primary school. The
law sets the minimum age for employment at 16, and prohibits children younger
than 18 from participating in hazardous work, defined as night work (between 7
p.m. and 5 a.m.), the worst forms of child labor as defined under International
Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 182, or any work deemed difficult,
unsanitary, or dangerous by MIFOTRA. The 2010 ministerial order on the worst
forms of child labor prohibits children from working in industrial institutions
and in domestic service, mining and quarrying, construction, brick making, or
applying fertilizers and pesticides. The law prohibits forced or compulsory
labor by children. The law prohibits children in military service,
prostitution, or pornography, as well as child trafficking and slavery.
Children must have a rest period of at least 12 hours between work periods. The
law provides six months to 20 years’ incarceration and fines of 500,000 Rwandan
francs ($795) to five million Rwandan francs ($7,935) for violations. The law
applies to contractual employment, but not unregistered employment such as
subsistence family farming or casual labor in agricultural cooperatives, and
thus leaves most working children unprotected. In addition to the national
laws, some districts enforced local regulations against hazardous child labor,
sanctioning employers and parents for violations; however, the government did
not enforce the law effectively. Police, immigration officials, local
government officials, and labor inspectors received training to identify
potential trafficking victims.
The newly formed NCC took the lead role in
designating responsible agencies and establishing actions to be taken,
timelines, and other concrete measures in relation to the Integrated Child
Rights Policy and various national commissions, plans, and policies related to
child protection subsumed therein. The National Advisory Committee on Child
Labor continued drafting the overdue 2008 National Policy for the Elimination
of Child Labor and 2007 Five Year Action Plan to Combat Child Labor. At the
local level, 149 local child labor committees monitored incidents of child
labor. The government supported 30 labor inspectors, one in each district.
Although the government was unable to provide them with adequate resources to
identify effectively and prevent the use of child labor, the inspectors
regularly trained employers and local authorities on child labor issues. The
RNP continued to operate a Child Protection Unit. Child labor reduction and
school attendance benchmarks were enforced as part of district government
officials’ performance contracts.
The government continued to work with NGOs to
raise awareness of the problem and to identify and send to school or vocational
training children involved in child labor. In January the government
implemented a 12-year Basic Education Program to extend free, universal public
education by three additional years of secondary education, which aided in
reducing the incidence of child labor. The government fined those who illegally
employed children or sent their children to work instead of school. Teachers
and local authorities continued to receive training on the rights of children
and human rights. MIFOTRA raised public awareness of the worst forms of child
labor through radio shows, television announcements, and skits. The government
continued efforts to stop child prostitution through a high-profile public
campaign to discourage intergenerational sex and sexual procurement.
Child labor persisted throughout the agricultural
sector, among household domestics, in small companies and light manufacturing,
in crossborder transportation, and in the brick-making, charcoal,
rock-crushing, and mining industries. Children received low wages, and abuse
was common. In addition, child prostitution and trafficking of children were
problems. According to a report released in June 2011 by the ILO, UNICEF, and
the World Bank Group in partnership with the government, approximately 260,000
children (9 percent of children between the ages of five and 17) engaged in
child labor.
There were reports the M23 armed group
recruited dozens of Rwandan children as young as 12, as well as hundreds of
Congolese boys and men ages 13 to 29, from Rwandan refugee camps and Nkamira
Transit Center, some of them forcibly, to porter goods, collect intelligence,
cook, provide sex, serve as bodyguards, and fight on the front lines in the
eastern DRC. Rwandan and refugee children were increasingly trafficked to
Kigali, Uganda, Kenya, and elsewhere as forced laborers, domestic servants, and
prostitutes (see sections 2.d. and 6).
Also see the Department of Labor’s Findings
on the Worst Forms of Child Labor atwww.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/tda.htm.
There was no national minimum wage, but
MIFOTRA set industry-specific minimum wages in the small formal sector. For
example, in 2010 the minimum wage in the tea industry ranged from 500 to 1,000
Rwandan francs per day (approximately $0.83 to $1.66 at the 2010 exchange
rate), while in the construction industry it ranged from 1,500 to 5,000 Rwandan
francs a day ($2.50 to $8.30 at the 2010 exchange rate), depending on the skill
level. Minimum wages provided a higher standard of living than that of the
approximately 80 percent of the population relying on subsistence farming. The
government, as the country’s largest employer, effectively set most other
formal sector wage rates. The constitution requires equal pay for equal work.
The law provides a standard workweek of 45
hours and 18 to 21 days paid annual leave, in addition to official holidays.
Maternity leave is set at six weeks with full salary, and an optional
additional six weeks at 20 percent of salary. The law does not provide for premium
pay for overtime, but there are prohibitions on excessive compulsory overtime.
The law provides employers with the right to determine daily rest periods. In
practice most employees received a one-hour lunch break. The law regulates
hours of work and occupational health and safety (OHS) standards in the formal
wage sector. Ministerial orders No. 01 of 17/05/2012 determining modalities for
the establishing and functioning of occupational health and safety committees
and No. 02 of 17/05/2012 determining conditions for occupational health and
safety set forth Rwanda’s first comprehensive OHS standards. Workers do not
have the right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without
jeopardizing their jobs; however, the government established a list of
dangerous professions subject to heightened safety scrutiny. The same labor
standards apply to migrant and foreign workers as to Rwandan nationals. There
are no effective labor standards for the informal sector, which accounted for
89 percent of all establishments according to the 2011 Establishment Census.
MIFOTRA supported 30 labor inspectors, one in
each district, but the inspectors did not enforce labor standards effectively.
Penalties helped to deter the worst forms of child labor as indicated by the
continuing decrease in child labor, the high level of media attention to
arrests for the worst forms of child labor, and action by some key industries
to eliminate child labor; however, the government did not enforce the law
consistently. With regard to adult labor, the many violations reported to labor
unions compared with the relatively few actions taken by the government and
employers to remedy substandard working conditions suggested penalties were
insufficient to deter violations. MIFOTRA strengthened financial accountability
mechanisms for labor inspectors and districts during the year to ensure funds
were properly spent on inspections and other labor programming to prevent
violations and improve working conditions. UNICEF purchased tax-free motorcycles
for approximately half of MIFOTRA’s labor inspectors to allow for unannounced
site visits. Those inspectors who received motorcycles also received funds for
fuel and maintenance. To improve productivity and communication, MIFOTRA
provided inspectors with laptops, internet service, and mobile phone minutes;
the source of funding was unclear.
Some workers accepted less than the minimum
wage where one was set, with reports of some workers in Kigali accepting 300
Rwandan francs ($0.48) per day for casual labor. Families regularly
supplemented their incomes by working in small businesses or subsistence
agriculture. Most workers in the formal sector worked six days per week.
Violations of wage, overtime, and OHS standards were common in both the formal
and informal sectors. Local media highlighted a common problem with employers
not signing up employees for social security or occupational health insurance
and not paying into those required benefit systems. Workers in subcontractor
and business process outsourcing sectors were especially vulnerable to
hazardous or exploitative working conditions. Statistics on workplace
fatalities and accidents were not available, but MIFOTRA officials singled out
mining as a sector with significant problems implementing OHS standards. There
were no major industrial accidents during the year.
No comments:
Post a Comment